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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant Leland A. Martineau appeals a final judgment
entered against him for a written debt.

The Honorable Scott

Daniels in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
heard the case and entered his decision.

Original jurisdiction

for this appeal is in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the Court of
Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989).

The Court of Appeals now

has jurisdiction pursuant to the July 17, 1989 transfer of this
case by the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a breach of contract action which resulted in a
stipulated judgment at trial.

Defendant Martineau sought relief

from the judgment because Plaintiffs Strand/MLK assigned their
claim, but this motion was denied.

The terms of the stipulated

judgment were breached, and the trial court amended its judgment
to offer Strand/MLK a remedy.

Martineau asserted offsets to

Strand/MLK's judgment, but he had no standing to assert them and
they were dismissed by summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying

Defendant Martineau1s motion to set aside the Order and Judgment
by ruling that Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had
not been violated by the Strand/MLK's assignment of the second
mortgage to Nupetco, when the court substituted Nupetco as
Plaintiff.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by amending

the personal judgment against Martineau to remove the requirement
that Plaintiffs first foreclose on the Idaho property where
Martineau breached his stipulation and by his actions prevented
Plaintiffs' assignee from proceeding as stipulated.
3. Whether the trial court made the proper legal judgment in
granting summary judgment for Strand/MLK when there were no
disputed facts and when Martineau had no standing to assert
offsets to reduce Strand/MLK's judgment.

1

4.

Whether

the trial court abused

its discretion in

substituting Nupetco as a party after Strand/MLK assigned Nupetco
their cause of action, judgment, and mortgage.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17(a).
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
. . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest.

2.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 25(c).
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party, unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party. . . .

3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13(j).
(j) Claims Against Assignee.
Except as otherwise
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and
assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been
asserted against an assignor at the time of or before
notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his
assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim
of the assignee.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-21 and 48-1-22.
48-1-21• Extent of property rights of a partner.
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights
in specific partnership property, (2) his interest in
the partnership and (3) his right to participate in the
management.
48-1-22.
Nature of a partner's right in specific
partnership property.
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners of
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in
partnership.
2

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37.
48-1-37. Rules for distribution.
(1) The assets of a partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b)
The contributions of the
partners necessary for the payment
of all the liabilities specified in
subsection (2) of this section.
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall
rank in order of payment, as follows:
(a) Those owing to creditors other
than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other
than for capital and profits.
(c) Those to owing to partners in
respect of capital.
(d)
Those owing to partners in
respect of profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order
of their declaration in subsection (1) of this
section to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the
liabilities.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs Strand/MLK brought this action to enforce a loan

to Defendant Martineau evidenced by a second mortgage secured by
Idaho property.

During the trial the parties stipulated that the

mortgage was valid, that defenses to the validity of the mortgage
were waived, that judgment be entered against Martineau, and that
the Idaho property be foreclosed prior to pursuing Martineau for
any deficiency,

Martineau moved for relief from the judgment

because Strand/MLK had assigned the second mortgage to Nupetco.
The court denied this motion.

Martineau raised defenses in the

Idaho foreclosure action and caused the property to be placed in
bankruptcy, despite Martineau1s waiver of defenses.

Because

Martineau violated the terms of the stipulation, the trial court
3

amended its judgment to allow Strand/MLK to pursue the judgment
against Martineau without proceeding
foreclosure.

further on the Idaho

Martineau asserted his offsets and counterclaim, but

the court ruled them inapplicable to Plaintiffs claim because
Martineau had no standing to assert them.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings
The complaint was filed on August 2, 1983 (R. 2). Defendant

Martineau answered and counterclaimed on August 19, 1983 (R. 5).
Strand/MLK answered the counterclaim on September 30, 1983 (R. 9).
Discovery was undertaken and the trial began September 3, 1985 (R.
41).

During trial, the parties entered into a stipulation for

judgment against Martineau, that the second mortgage on Idaho
property was valid, that Martineau1s defenses to the mortgage were
waived, and that the Idaho property would be foreclosed before
action was taken against Martineau on a deficiency

(R. 50).

Strand assigned the Order and Judgment to Nupetco on October 18,
1985 (R. 490). Strand/MLK's assignee, Nupetco, brought an action
in Idaho to foreclose on the second mortgage on December 3, 1985
(R. 67-71).

Although Martineau had waived his defenses to the

validity of the mortgage, defenses were raised in the Idaho
action.

The Idaho court rejected the defenses June 27, 1986 (R.

99-107).

Shortly after the Idaho ruling and ten months after the

entry of the judgment, on July 8, 1986, Martineau filed a motion
for relief from the judgment claiming that Strand/MLK were not the
real party in interest and that Martineau had been prejudiced
because of the assignment (R. 54). The Motion for Relief from the
Judgment was denied on October 29, 1986 (R. 128). On November 24,
4

1986, Nupetco tiled an Appearance of Counsel (R. 125). Martineau
filed a Notice of Appeal from the November 10, 1986 Order dated
December 9, 1^8b, (R. 12.6)

and on the same day, Martineau's

counsel withdrew from representation (R. 132).
dismissed on October 2, 1987 (R. 302).

The appeal was

On March 26, 1987,

Martineau, as the general partner of Magic Valley Properties,
caused Magic Valley Properties to file a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Petition to stay the foreclosure action in the State of Idaho (R.
524).
The assertion of defenses in the Idaho foreclosure (R. 99107) and placing the property into bankruptcy (R. 524), were
violations of the Order and Judgment of October 11, 1935#

Nupetco

filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment to relieve Nupetco of the
obligation to foreclose the Idaho property prior to seeking
satisfaction of the judgment from Martineau (R. 305). Martineau
replied to Nupetco's motion and after hearing, Nupetcofs motion to
amend the judgment was granted (R. 338). Martineau filed a Motion
to Reconsider the Motion to Amend Judgment (R. 345), but said
motions were denied (R. 391).

At the hearing on Martineau's

Motion to Reconsider, the Court ordered that Martineau submit an
affidavit setting forth the offsets alleged by Martineau against
Strand/MLK (R. 391).

On December 14, 1987, Martineau submitted

his Affidavit of Claimed Offsets to the Court for adjudication (R.
420).

The Affidavit and subsequent discovery disclosed that

Martineau's offsets had been assigned to the Hammons-Martineau
Partnership.

The tri*l concerning these offsets wis scheduled for

January 19, 1988 before Judge Moffat, because of a trade in the
5

docket with Judge Daniels.

At the time scheduled for trial, the

Court continued the trial in light of Nupetco's Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 697) and the parties entered into a stipulation
precluding the assignment or change in the interests or identities
of the parties and assignees (R. 697).

On January 29, 1988,

Nupetco filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of the Plaintiffs' Motion

for Summary Judgment

(R. 453).

Martineau responded on February 8, 1988 (R. 507) and Strand/MLK
filed a Response Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment on February 12, 1988 (R. 544).

The matter was set for

hearing and heard on April 1, 1988 (R. 558).

On August 23, 1988

the court granted Strand/MLK1s motion for summary judgment (R.
561).

In response to the Summary Judgement, Martineau filed a

Motion for Relief from Judgment on September 23, 1988 (R. 565).
This Motion was denied on October 7, 1988 (R. 576).

On October

14, 1988, Martineau filed a Motion for Stay of Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal or in the Alternative for Approval of
Assignment of Judgment of Supersedeas Bond (R. 577).

On October

21, 1988, the Court ruled that the Motion for Stay of Execution
Pending Appeal was granted.

At the same hearing, the Court

granted the motion to substitute Nupetco as the party plaintiff
and to enter judgment in favor of Nupetco (R. 596).

Martineau

filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment and other motions relating to
this proceeding, which were all denied

(R. 652).

The Order

Substituting the Parties and naming Nupetco as Plaintiff was
executed April 26, 1989 (R. 663).

The Amended Summary Judgment

against Leland Martineau was also entered April 26, 1989 (R. 666).
6

Notice of Appeal on this action was filed on May 25, 1989 (R.
667).
C.

Statement of the Facts
Because Defendant misstates important facts and fails to

include important facts in his fact statement, Nupetco finds it
necessary to set forth its own statement of the facts.
Michael

W. Strand

and MLK

Investments

(hereinafter

"Plaintiffs" or "Strand/MLK") filed their Complaint on August 2,
1983 listing three causes of action: breach of contract for the
repayment of a loan to Martineau in the amount of $427, 939.25,
unjust enrichment, and conversion of said sum.

(R. 2-4)

The

contract was evidenced by a second mortgage on Idaho property (R.
6 4 ) , but Strand/MLK did not seek to foreclose the mortgage
because no note embodying the underlying obligation on the
mortgage existed, and a previous foreclosure action in Idaho was
dismissed

(R. 162).

Prior to the dismissal of the Idaho

foreclosure action, Strand/MLK assigned the mortgage to Nupetco
Associates (hereinafter "Nupetco") on April 27, 1983 (R. 66). The
underlying obligation had not been assigned by Plaintiffs, but was
later assigned on August 12, 1985 (R. 489).
At trial, Strand/MLK intended to utilize the mortgage
document as evidence of Martineau's indebtedness (R. 162-164).
The Complaint named several Defendants, but only Defendant Leland
A. Martineau

(hereinafter

"Defendant"

Appellant herein, responded to the action.

"Martineau"), the
Martineau filed an

Answer and Counterclaim asserting claims for accounting, audit,
and financial services performed by Martineau and Co. (R. 5-8).
7

On August 12, 1985, Strand/MLK assigned all of their right, title
and interest in this cause of action to Nupetco (R. 489).
The trial began September 3, 1985, and after the morning
session, Martineau argued a motion to dismiss Strand/MLK' s
complaint on the basis of the one action rule, claiming that
Strand/MLK failed to exhaust the security before initiating this
action.

In response to that motion Strand/MLK1s attorney, Mr.

Caine, stated:
. . . [Plaintiffs] did, in fact, initiate a lawsuit to
foreclose the second mortgage in the State of Idaho
prior to this suit being initiated here. That suit was
dismissed based upon, really, a stipulation of all the
parties wherein it was determined that under Idaho law,
the second mortgage in fact really isn't a mortgage
because there is no underlying note and could not be
foreclosed.
The Court obviously understands that to foreclose-so that the Court is clear, the property we're talking
about foreclosing is in Burley, Cassia County, Idaho.
So foreclosure against real property couldn't lie here.
It would have to go as an action in rem.
So they tried to do that. The case was dismissed
up there on the basis in effect that all the parties
recognize that under Idaho law, this mortgage was
defective because there's no underlying note. Also, it
may very well be defective on its face. Under our law
or any other law when you have a comment saying, "This
is to secure indebtedness between the parties in varying
amounts in excess of $200,000.00." It's not clear to me
whether that is a sum certain and can obviously be
attacked in our own jurisdiction.
So there's some question to validity of this
mortgage to begin with. And I submit we have not plead
either the validity or invalidity of this document as a
mortgage in this case, but very simply produced this as
a piece of evidence indicating, if you will, as an
admission against interest, against Mr. Martineau, that
the debt we're talking about here is a loan. . . .
that's part of the case demonstrating a loan.
Under that extent, this is not being treated as a
mortgage per se, but is evidence indicating an admission
against the interest . . .
8

(R. 162-164)

As Mr. Caine continued his argument, Martineau

entered into a stipulation with Strand/MLK to allow Strand/MLK to
foreclose on the Idaho property before any further action was
taken in this case.
Mr. Caine: Secondly, I think in the situation we
have in this case that there was an attempt to foreclose
on the mortgage, and if—if counsel for Mr. Martineau is
now saying in this proceeding and are willing to
stipulate that, in fact, there is a $327,000.00 debt,
that's evidence—even though it's not a promissory note,
there is a debt that is secured by that note—or secured
by that mortgage, excuse me, and willing to stipulate to
that, that's fine. We'll stop right now and go up to
Idaho.
Mr. Kipp:
The Court:
Mr. Caine:
the property.
Mr. Kipp:
The Court:
do then.
Mr. Caine:

We accept it.
All right.

That settles the case.

You stipulate that that is secured by
We accept it. We accept that proffer.
All right.

Well, that's what we will

All right.

The Court: We'll stipulate there's a $327,000.00
debt secured by the second mortgage.
(R. 16 5-166)

Martineau stipulated that the second mortgage was

valid and waived his defenses to that mortgage.

The stipulation

was embodied in the Order and Judgment signed by Judge Daniels
dated October 11, 1985 (R. 50-51).

The Order and Judgment entered

a personal judgment against Martineau, ordered and established the
second mortgage on the Idaho property valid, ordered that all
Martineau's defenses against the second mortgage were waived, and
required Plaintiffs to foreclose the Idaho property before seeking
the personal assets of Martineau to satisfy a deficiency (R. 509

51).

The Order and Judgment was also assigned to Nupetco on

October 18, 1985 (R. 490).

Nupetco ratified and affirmed the

stipulation by filing an action to foreclose the mortgage in the
Idaho Courts on December 3, 1985 (R. 67-71).
In the Idaho action, Martineau raised numerous defenses in an
attempt to defeat Judge Daniels1 October 11, 1985 Order and
Judgment.

Martineau argued that the foreign judgment was void

because Nupetco lacked capacity and standing, the Idaho court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the statute of limitations for
enforcing the mortgage had run, the claim was not being prosecuted
by the real party in interest, and Nupetco had failed to obtain
jurisdiction over all named defendants.

(R. 99-107, 306)

defenses were all rejected by the Idaho courts.

These

(R. 99-107).

Shortly after the ruling in the Idaho courts, on July 10,
1986, approximately ten months after the Order and Judgment was
executed by Judge Daniels, and eight months after Nupetco filed
its action to foreclose the second mortgage in Idaho, Martineau
filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment arguing that the
action had not been pursued by the real party in interest and the
assignment of the second mortgage to Nupetco prejudiced Martineau
and Martineau was not able to assert all his possible defenses at
trial (R. 58-63).

This motion was denied on October 29, 1986 (R.

118, 120).
Martineau violated the terms of the Order and Judgment
entered on October 11, 1985 by filing and arguing the Motion for
Relief from Order and Judgment, by arguing in the Idaho courts
that the foreign judgment was void because Nupetco lacked capacity
10

and

standing, that the Utah court

lacked

subject

matter

jurisdiction, that the statute of limitations for enforcing the
mortgage had run, that the claim was not being prosecuted by the
real party

in interest, that Nupetco had failed to obtain

jurisdiction over all named defendants (R. 99-107, 306), and by
filing bankruptcy on the Idaho property (R. 524).

More than two

years after the entry of the Order and Judgment, after Martineau
had thwarted all attempts of Nupetco to foreclose on the Idaho
property and fulfil the terms of the stipulation, Nupetco filed a
Motion to Amend the Judgment to relieve Nupetco of the obligation
to foreclose the Idaho property prior to pursuing Martineau on the
judgment (R. 305).

After hearing, Nupetco's motion to amend the

judgment was granted (R. 338).
Subsequently, the Court ordered Martineau to submit an
affidavit setting forth the

offsets he sought to assert against

the judgment (R. 391). On December 14, 1987, Martineau submitted
his Affidavit of Claimed Offsets seeking recovery for accounting
services performed

for Strand and Strand related entities,

accounting services performed for Magic Valley Properties, and to
satisfy a personal judgment against Strand in favor of David
Hammons

(R. 420).

The Affidavit and subsequent discovery

disclosed that Martineau's offsets had been assigned to the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership (R. 420, 430). The trial concerning
these offsets was scheduled for January 19, 1988 before Judge
Moffat, because of a trade in the docket with Judge Daniels.
Judge Moffat continued the trial because of Nupetco's Motion for
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Summary Judgment

(R. 697) and the parties entered into a

stipulation:
The Court:
You have a stipulation, I think,
regarding the status and posture, the citus [sic], if
you would, of the current claims and counterclaims. Do
you want to put that in the record—somebody?
Mr. Petty: If I can articulate that perhaps. The
parties stipulate that Strand's assignee, Nupetco, and
Martineau's assignee, the party known as the Hammons
Partnership, agree, that from this point from today's
date until the time of trial and through trial, that the
respective interests of these assignees and parties will
not change —there will be no assignments of claims or
interests from the assignees in any way and—
The Court:

As they relate to this action.

Mr. Petty:

As they relate to this action.

Mr. Green:

That's stipulating my stipulation.

Mr. Caine:
agreement.

That's my understanding

of the

The Court: To put it another way: You're saying
the claims and counterclaims that are as of now held by
Nupetco on the one hand and the Hammons-Martineau
Partnership on the other hand, will not be assigned or
transferred or in any way altered. Those claims will
remain static and identical from now down through trial.
Mr. Caine:

That's correct.

The C o u r t :
I a s s u m e t h e y ' l l n o t t a k e any
a d d i t i o n a l c l a i m s o r d e f e n s e s or a s s i g n m e n t s from
anybody e l s e e i t h e r .

(R. 6 97)

Mr. Petty:

Not to be utilized.

Mr. Caine:

Not in this action.

Mr. Green:

So stipulate.

The summary judgment arguments were fully briefed and

heard, and on August 23, 1988 the Court granted Strand/MLK motion
for summary judgment (R. 561) stating:
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. . . because Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his
interest in the alleged claims and offsets asserted in
this action to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is
unable to assert said claims and offsets against the
personal judgment entered against him, and the Court
therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Nupetco
Associates.
(R. 665). Subsequently, Nupetco was substituted as Plaintiff on
April 26, 1989 (R. 663).
D.

Disputed Facts
Defendant Martineau repeatedly asserts that he was prejudiced

and unable to assert his offsets and counterclaims against
Strand/MLK and Nupetco because he was unaware of the assignment of
the second mortgage from Strand/MLK to Nupetco (Appellants brief,
p. 9, 24,).

Martineau's offsets were presented to the court by

Affidavit (R. 420).

Any offsets or claims Martineau had against

Strand/MLK or Nupetco could have been asserted at that time.
Martineau was never precluded from asserting his offsets and
claims as a result of the assignment of the second mortgage.
Martineau asserts that Nupetco's attorney, Ralph Petty, undertook
to file motions on behalf of Strand and MLK (Appellants brief, p.
11, 13,).

Mr. Petty has always represented Nupetco and has not

represented Strand or MLK, who at all times had independent
counsel, John Caine.
Martineau states that he was precluded from joining the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership as a party to this action by Judge
Moffat and ordered not to make any transfers or disposition of the
partnership interest and offsets (Appellants Brief, p. 15, 32).
However, Martineau entered into a stipulation that the interests
and parties remain unchanged until the time of trial (R. 697,
13

p.4).

Judge Moffat made no order concerning the parties or their

interests, and any preclusion of Martineau was based upon his own
stipulation.
Martineau asserts that he " . . . represented to the court
that, with leave of court to do so, he could obtain written
ratification of his personal use of these offsets, assignment of
them back to him in his individual capacity or the joinder or
substitution of the partnership as defendant." Appellant's Brief,
p. 3 4 ) .

However, there is no reference to the record to

substantiate this claim.

In fact, Martineau was precluded from

taking any steps to change the parties or their interests in this
action on the basis of his own stipulation.
Martineau asserts that he had authorization from the HammonsMartineau Partnership
partnership.
produced

to assert the offsets owned by that

As evidence for that authorization, Martineau

the partnership agreement.

The provision of the

partnership agreement does not authorize Martineau to assert the
offsets owned by the partnership and Martineau failed to provide
any other evidence of the alleged authorization.
Martineau alleges that this action is based upon an oral
agreement (Appellant's Brief, p. 1, 17, 25).

The complaint

alleges that the agreement was based on a writing, and the second
mortgage was acknowledged by Martineau to be written evidence of
the loan (R. 156).
Martineau questions whether the court found Martineau in
contempt in conjunction with Strand/MLK's Motion to Amend the
Judgment (Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31).
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There was no finding by

the trial court of contempt.

The basis of the Amended Judgment

was a breach of the stipulation embodied in the Order and
Judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The real party in interest requirements of Rule 17(a)

were satisfied when Nupetco was substituted as party Plaintiff.
Pursuant to Rule 25(c) , the court was within its discretion to
allows the action to go forward despite Strand/MLK's assignment of
their mortgage to Nupetco.

Martineau was not prejudiced by the

assignment, was able to assert his defenses pursuant to Rule
13(j)f did in fact assert his counterclaims and offsets, and was
defeated in those assertions as a matter of law.
2.

The Order and Judgment was the embodiment of the

stipulation

of the parties

at trial.

Pursuant

to that

stipulation, Martineau stipulated to the entry of a personal
judgment against him, that the mortgage on the Idaho property was
valid, and that all of his defenses relating to the validity of
the mortgage were waived, and that Strand/MLK would immediately
foreclosure on the Idaho property.

In direct violation of this

stipulation, Martineau asserted defenses in the Idaho foreclosure
action and caused the property to be placed under the protection
of the bankruptcy court.

As a result, the Court exercised

appropriate discretion in amending the Judgment to remove the
restriction

requiring Strand/MLK to foreclose on the Idaho

property prior to enforcing the judgment against Martineau.
3.

Martineau did not own the offsets and counterclaim which

he sought to assert against Strand/MLK and, where there was no
15

material issue of fact alleged, Strand/MLK filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment requesting the court to dismiss counterclaims and
offsets which Martineau did not own and had no standing to assert.
Martineau stipulated prior to the hearing on the summary judgment
motion, that no interest of the parties or the parties themselves
would be altered before trial.
Martineau

from asserting

The law precludes an individual

the claims of a partnership as a

counterclaim or offset against a third party
individual claim against Martineau.

Plaintiff's

The stipulation precluded

Martineau from substituting or adding a party and Martineau
produced no evidence at the hearing, and no evidence appears in
the record, of the partnership's agreement that Martineau is
authorized to assert partnership claims for his own individual
benefit, and the offsets fail.
4.

It was well within the discretion of the court to add

Nupetco as a Plaintiff, especially in light of Rules 17(a) and
25(c), granting the court discretion to substitute parties.
Martineau has cited no authority for the proposition that it was
error to allow Nupetco to prosecute this action prior to becoming
a named party, and this issue is raised Eor the first time on
appeal and should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER AND
JUDGMENT AS A VIOLATION OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
RULE.
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A.

The Substitution of Nupetco as Plaintiff Satisfies and
Eliminates the Real Party in Interest Defense,
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in

pertinent part:
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. .
. . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in
interest; and such ratification, joinder, and
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action
had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest.
The purpose of the real party in interest rule was stated by
the advisory committee:
[T]he modern function of the rule in its negative aspect
is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent
action by the party actually entitled to recover, and
insure generally that the judgment will have its proper
effect as res judicata.
39 F.R.D. 84-85 (1966).

The 1966 amendment to Rule 17(a) added

the last sentence which reflects the general policy that the
choice of a party at the pleading stage need not be made at the
risk of final dismissal of the action should it later appear that

Standard of Proof.
The trial court's denial of a 60(b) motion, is only
overturned on appeal when it is shown that the trial judgment
clearly abused his discretion.
"The district court judge is
vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting
or denying a motion to set aside a judgment." Kate v. Pierce, 732
P.2d 92 (Utah 1986).
See also, State ex rel. Utah State
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1983).
Likewise, when the trial court amends the pleadings to
substitute a party, this decision will only be disturbed by a
showing of ". . . abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice."
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988).
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there had been an error.

6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d §1555 (1990).
The courts have recognized that the purpose of Rule 17(a) is
to liberalize party rules, and liberal construction will always be
given to effect that purpose.

3A Moore's Federal Practice If 17.07

(2d ed. 1948); Kilborn v. Western Sur. Co., 187 F.2d 567 (C.A.
10th, 1951); Price & Pierce Limited v. Jarka Great Lakes Corp., 37
F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mich. 1941).

The Utah Supreme Court has

defined the purpose of Rule 17(a) as follows:
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action
prosecuted by the real party in interest to avoid
further action on the same demand by another and to
permit the defendant to assert all the defenses or
counterclaims available against the real owner of the
cause.
Shaw v. Jepsen, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745
(1952).
Under the circumstances of this case it is
clear that the purpose of the rule has been satisfied.
Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980).

Both

assignor (Strand/MLK) and assignee (Nupetco) were before the trial
court, asserting one action against Martineau.

Martineau has no

risk of duplicate or inconsistent claims being pursued against him
and his real party in interest defense fails.
Martineau retained every claim, defense, and offset he ever
possessed against Strand despite the assignment of the mortgage to
Nupetco.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13(j) states:

(j) Claims Against Assignee.
Except as otherwise
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and
assignments of accounts receivable, any claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been
asserted against an assignor at the time of or before
notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his
assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim
of the assignee.
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See also, Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962).
Martineau has shown no inability or prejudice in asserting his
claims and offsets because of the assignment.

Martineau did

present his offsets which were fully considered by the court (R.
420).
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 17(a), on April 26, 1989, Judge
Daniels substituted Nupetco as the party plaintiff. (R. 663-664).
(See Addendum Exhibit "E")

The substitution of Nupetco has ". . .

the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest."

Rule 17(a).

The real party in

interest defense " . . . should be applied only to cases in which
substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid
injustice."

6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice &

Procedure, Civil 2d §1555 (1990).

Martineau made no showing of

prejudice or injustice in this action.
B.

Pursuant to Rule 25(c), the Action may Continue in the Name
of Strand/MLK Despite the Assignment to Nupetco.
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(c) Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party, unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.

The Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559,
252 P.2d 538, 539 (1953), has recognized this rule to prevent the
dismissal of an action when the action is assigned while the case
is pending:
The answer to any contention that the court lost
jurisdiction in this suit between Tree and Hess when the
latter conveyed during the pendency of the action, might
well be found in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil
19

Strand/MLK assigned their cause of action to Nupetco three weeks
before the trial (R. 489). (See Addendum Exhibit "C")

Rule 25(c)

allows the action to continue in the names of the original parties
and any judgment reached in the ongoing action accrues to the
assignee.
The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that
it does not require that anything be done after an
interest has been transferred.
The action may be
continued by or against the original party, and the
judgment will be binding on his successor in interest
even though he is not named.
7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d
§1958

(1986).

The court was free to allow this action to

proceeded in the name of Strand/MLK or to substitute Nupetco as
plaintiff.

Martineau asserted the real party in interest defense

in both the Idaho (R. 102) and Utah actions (R.54), but when both
of these motions were denied, Martineau failed to take the
additional step necessary to resolve his perceived injustice; he
made no motion to substitute Nupetco as a party.
Where no motion for substitution or joinder is made, the
action will continue in the name of the original party,
and the transferee does not become a party to the
action. In the event that the transferee has not been
substituted or joined as an additional party to the
action, he nonetheless will be bound by an adverse
judgment, even though not a party, for his rights are no
better than his transferor's; and similarly if the
judgment is in favor of the transferor the adjudication
enures to the benefit of the transferee. Of course, if

Procedure, designed to continue the litigation with the
same litigants to a determinative conclusion. Were it
otherwise, litigation might arrive at stalemate by the
simple device of a conveyance pendente lite, resulting
in a series of endless suits.
20

the transferee has been substituted or joined as an
additional party pursuant to Rule 25(c) he is similarly
bound by an adverse judgment and benefited by a
favorable judgment.
3B Moore's Federal Practice J 25.08 (2d ed. 1948).

The court

acted within its discretion in allowing the action to be continued
in the name of Strand/MLK and in substituting Nupetco on the
strength of the assignment of the cause of action.
C,

Defendant Martineau Waived His Right to Claim the Defense of
Real Party in Interest.
The real party in interest defense is waived if not timely

asserted.

Assertion of the real party in interest defense:

. . is for the benefit of Defendant, and should be
raised in timely fashion or it may be deemed waived.
See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,
§ 1554, pages 700-704.
Audio-Visual Marketing Corp. v. Omni Corp., 545 F.2d 715, 719
(C.A. 10th 1976).

See also, Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383 (C.A.

10th 1982)(The real party in interest defense may be waived if not
raised in a timely fashion and Defendant who knew facts necessary
to assert the defense for a year and a half prior to the filing of
the Complaint waived this defense).

The real party in interest

defense not raised until after trial was waived.

See, U.S.F.& G.

Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp 563, (N.D. Ala 1961).
Three months before Strand/MLK filed the complaint and three
years before Martineau asserted the real party in interest defense
(R. 100, 108, 115), Strand assigned the second mortgage to Nupetco
and provided Martineau with constructive knowledge of the
assignment.

In addition, Wayne G. Petty1s Affidavit establishes
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that he prepared and recorded the Assignment and personally
notified Leland Martineau by telephone and in person of Nupetco1s
interest in the subject property (R. 115-116).

Martineau has

presented no evidence to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that Martineau waived his real party in
interest defense.

Absent such a showing, the decision of the

trial court should be upheld.
D.

Defendant Martineau Failed to Establish that the Court
Abused its Discretion by Allowing the Action to Continue in
the Name of Strand/MLK.
Martineau alleges that Strand's assignment of the mortgage to

Nupetco disqualified Strand as the real party in interest and
justified a dismissal of this action.

This argument fails because

the action was brought to enforce the underlying obligation
referred to in the mortgage, not to enforce the mortgage itself.
An action to enforce the mortgage was brought in Idaho and failed
because no note existed requiring the repayment of the loan (R.
205).

Strand/MLK owned the claim on the underlying obligation

until it was assigned to Nupetco on August 12, 1985 (R. 489) , two
years after the complaint was filed and three weeks before trial.
Strand/MLK were the real parties in interest when the action was
initiated and the court appropriately allowed the action to
continue in the name of Strand/MLK pursuant to Rule 25(c).
Martineau has failed to establish that the court abused its
discretion by denying Martineau's Motion, for Relief from the
Judgment because of an alleged violation of the real party in
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interest

rule.

Absent

such a showing,

t h e appeal must be

dismissed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN AMENDING
THE OCTOBER 11, 1985 ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED AGAINST THE PERSONAL ASSETS OF
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU.
A.

The Judgment was a Personal Money Judgment, with a Condition
of Foreclosure Before Seeking Personal Assets,
Martineau argues that the judgment was never a personal

judgment against him and that the parties agreed to consider
whether a deficiency judgment would be granted against Martineau
at a future time.

This is not the case.

The Order and Judgment

is a personal judgment against Martineau.

The judgment states in

pertinent part:
1. The mortgage attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is
a valid mortgage given to the Plaintiff, Michael Strand
by Leland Martineau and Charles Water to secure an
obligation of $327,989.25 . . . .
3. The Plaintiffs . . . are required to foreclose
said mortgage against the property . . . before
proceeding against the personal assets of the Defendant
Martineau.
(R. 50-51)

The transcript

of the hearing

including

the

stipulation confirms that the parties intended that the judgment
be personal against Martineau.

Martineau's attorney stated that

Strand/MLK were not:

3
Standard of Review.
When enforcing a compromise settlement or stipulation the
trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown that there was
an abuse of discretion. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah
1987); Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602 (Utah 1982); Bambrouqh
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
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. . . entitled to a personal judgment against Mr.
Martineau on this $300,000.00 plus until he foreclosed
on that second mortgage and until that property is sold.
And then if there is a deficiency, he'll have a judgment
against him personally for the deficiency.
(R. 159)

The hearing continued:

The Court:
Well, if that property—if you
foreclose on that property, I would think that they are
allowed—if you foreclose, there's a sale, there's a
deficiency, you get a deficiency judgment.
Mr. Kipp: Deficiency. They'll have a deficiency
judgment against whomever are the makers, I guess the
trustors or the signors of the mortgage.
The Court:
I would think so.
I think Leland
Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley Properties—Mr.
Caine that's it. That's our understanding.
(R. 16 8)

Martineau stipulated that the Idaho property would be

sold and the proceeds used towards the judgment before turning to
his personal assets.

The language of the Order and Judgment

expresses the Court's intent to enter a personal judgment against
Martineau.
B.

Defendant Martineau Violated the Stipulation; The Court was
within its Power to Fashion an Appropriate Remedy.
Martineau violated the Order and Judgment entered on October

11, 1985 by filing and arguing in the Idaho court that the foreign
judgment was void because Nupetco lacked capacity and standing,
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the
statute of limitations for enforcing the mortgage had run, that
the claim was not being prosecuted by the real party in interest,
and that Nupetco had failed to obtain jurisdiction over all named
defendants (R. 99-107, 306).

When it became obvious that the

Idaho Courts would rule that the property must be foreclosed and
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sold, Martineau caused the property to be placed in bankruptcy (R.
524).

In the Utah action, Martineau filed and argued the Motion

for Relief from Order and Judgment asserting similar defenses.
Martineaufs acts made the Order and Judgment unenforceable.

In

determining whether a stipulation can be enforced, when breached
by one of the parties, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . when the parties failed to perform in accordance
with their stipulations, the Court was not powerless to
require them to abide by their agreement. It would
indeed be a serious reflection upon our system of
jurisprudence if parties could stipulate an agreement of
settlement but refuse with impunity from performing.
Courts are not impotent when one or more parties to a
stipulation becomes recalcitrant.
Johnson v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d
171 (1954).

"It is quite well established that a settlement

agreement may be summarily enforced by motion in the court of the
original action."

Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead,

592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979); Millerberq v. Steadman, 645 P.2d
602 (Utah 1982).
It

is

commonly held

that
4
p a r t i e s may not be t o l e r a t e d .

violations

of

The California

stipulations

by

Court of Appeals

stated:

Some c o u r t s hold p a r t i e s in contempt for f l a g r a n t l y
v i o l a t i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n and the r e s u l t i n g o r d e r .
In Montana v.
Kinman, 430 P.2d 110, 112 (Mont. 1967), the court s t a t e d :
The f a c t s i t u a t i o n as indicated by the t r i a l court in
i t s comments in the record are such t h a t the t r i a l court
should have found s p e c i f i c a l l y respondents Kinman in
contempt.
The t r i a l c o u r t a c t u a l l y made such a
conclusion as hereinbefore i n d i c a t e d , but concluded t h a t
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Such a stipulation made in open court constitutes "not
only agreements between the parties, but between them
and the Court, which the latter is bound to enforce, not
only for the benefit of the party interested, . . . but
for the protection of its own honor and dignity."
[Quoting Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 14 P.2d 523].
Cathcart v. Gregory, 45 Cal. App. 2d 179, 113 P.2d 894, 898
(1941).

The same Court also stated:

The violation of a valid and unrevoked stipulation may
be redressed on behalf of one who is not himself in
default by the Court in which it is entered into. . . .
Plaintiff's refusal to comply with the agreement of
settlement and the order constitute a breach of his
obligation.
Faye v. Fieldman, 128 Cal. App. 2d 319, 275 P.2d 121, 127 (1954).
The case at bar greatly resembles Royal Resources, Inc. v.
Gibralter Financial Corp. , 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979).

In that

case, the parties stipulated to a judgment against defendant and
plaintiff would seek compensation from a third source (federal
insurance) before going after defendant for payment.
court ordered

that the trial of the unresolved

The lower
issues of

defendant's personal liability would be continued without date.
When the insurance proceeds were not paid to plaintiffs, judgment

it was an idle gesture.
Idle gesture indeed!
Respondents' actions were a direct contemptuous flouting
of their own stipulation, of direct court orders, and of
valid and valuable rights of the [Plaintiff]. As such
this court cannot and will not ignore its duty to
correct the error. Therefore, to end this phase of the
litigation, contempt is found.
The court
enforce a
Although
contempt,

is therefore justified in exercising its discretion to
judgment and, if necessary, find Defendant in contempt.
the trial court made no finding that Defendant was in
it had power to fashion an appropriate remedy.
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was entered individually against defendant based on the strength
of the stipulation.

The Court stated:

The judgment against [the corporate defendant] was of
little or no value except for the possibility of
compensation that may have been forthcoming from [the
federal insurance]/ and as it now stands, the judgment
has no value at all. Also, said judgment was clearly in
the best interest of [the individual defendants] since
it deferred the determination of their own liability,
and in fact it would have absolved them of liability had
the claim against [the federal insurer] materialized.
Needless to say, it was highly appropriate for trial
court to accept the various stipulations of the parties
and so attempt to resolve the law suit.
Id. at 796.

As in Royal Resources, Martineau's stipulation

attempted to insulate and minimize personal liability to the
extent of the value of the real property in Idaho.

As a direct

result of Martineau's actions, Strand/MLK, notwithstanding prompt,
reasonable effort, consistent with the stipulation and the court's
judgment, were prevented from obtaining the benefits of the
stipulation.

Strand/MLK were therefore entitled to have the

provisions of the Order and Judgment amended to allow Strand/MLK
to pursue Martineau personally under the terms of the Order and
Judgment.
C.

The Utah Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Idaho Property;
the Court has Discretion to Fashion a Remedy within its
Jurisdiction.
The Judgment and Order personally bound Martineau, but was

not binding upon the Idaho real property securing the mortgage.
The Court had in personam jurisdiction over Martineau, but the
Idaho real property, and any foreclosure action on that property,
were outside the court's jurisdiction.
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In Hammond v. Wall, 51

Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918), the Utah Supreme Court held that the
Utah courts do not have jurisdiction to require foreclosure of
Idaho land.

The Supreme Court stated:

"Lands lying in one state cannot
under order, license, or decree of a
different state. The jurisdiction
loci rei sitae governs."
[quoting
Sales, § 58]
Id. at 151.

be reached or sold
court entered in a
is local, the lex
Rorer on Judicial

The Court continued and stated that the Utah trial

court:
. . . was powerless to foreclose the mortgage on lands
lying in Idaho and to order the sheriff of Wasatch
County to sell those lands and to apply the proceeds in
satisfaction of the mortgage. The law clothed the
sheriff with no such power and the Court was powerless
to invest him therewith.
The District Court had
jurisdiction to grant the relief respecting the
reaffirmation of the deed and mortgage, since to that
extent the action was merely in personam and operated
only on the persons interest in the transactions and in
the mortgage premises.
Id.
Despite the Utah court's lack of jurisdiction over the Idaho
property, the amendment to the judgment did not violate the one
action rule.

The action to collect on the underlying obligation

is procedural and does not bar a collection action in another
state on the underlying debt.

Martin v. Midgett, 100 Az. 284, 413

P.2d 754 (1966);5 Maxwell v. Ricks, 294 F. 255 (9th Cir. 1923);6
"We agree that the provisions of [the] California [one
action rule] are procedural only and do not bar plaintiff from
recovery in this action [on the notes] filed in . . . Arizona."
413 P.2d at 757.
" . . . the enforcement of the payment of the debt
evidenced by the notes is but a remedy, limited, as already said,
in an action brought in the courts of California, but not so
united with the common-law right as to preclude the maintenance of
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Mantle v. Dabney, 47 Wash. 394, 92 P. 134 (1907);

Felton v. West,

Q

102 Cal. 266, 36 P. 676 (1894).

In the case at bar, the parties'

stipulated to foreclose the Idaho property and attribute the
proceeds to satisfy Martineau1s personal judgment.

Strand/MLK,

and their assignee Nupetco, consistent with the stipulation,
sought foreclosure of the property in Idaho.

Defendant, contrary

to the stipulation, interfered with the foreclosure action.
Consequently, the court utilized its power to fashion a remedy to
provide Plaintiffs the benefit of the stipulation and the court's
judgment.

Removing the foreclosure requirement does not violate

the one action rule.
POINT III
THE LAW WILL NOT ENFORCE OFFSETS
OWNED BY ENTITIES NOT PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
A.

Summary Judgment was Properly Entered Because Defendant
Martineau may not Assert Claims or Offsets not Owned by Him.
The order granting summary judgment states:
. . . because Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his
interest in the alleged claims and offsets asserted in
this action to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is

an action on the debt in the federal court [of Washington], if the
necessary diversity of citizenship exists." 294 F. at 257.

7

"We do not t h i n k t h i s s t a t u t e can have t h e e f f e c t of
m a k i n g a f o r e c l o s u r e upon t h e s e c u r i t y in C a l i f o r n i a a
p r e r e q u i s i t e to an action upon the note in t h i s s t a t e . " 92 P. at
134.
g
"[The one action rule] only refers to actions for the
recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage upon property situated in
the state of California. The context clearly evidences that fact.
All the provisions of the section entirely negative the idea of
any other construction. We cannot assume that the authors of this
legislation attempted to establish a procedure for the foreclosure
of mortgages upon realty situated in other states." 36 P. at 667.
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unable to assert said claims and offsets against the
personal judgment entered against himf and the Court
therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Nupetco
Associates.
(R. 665).

This summary judgment was in response to Martineau1s

offsets and claims against Strand/MLK.

In

his

Affidavit

of

Claimed Offsets (R. 420-425) Martineau set forth three classes of
offsets:
a. Alleged accounting fees incurred by Strand and
Strand-related entities.
b. Alleged accounting services for Magic Valley
Properties, a partnership in which Martineau is a
partner and claims Strand is a partner.
c. The judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court in favor of David Hammons and against Plaintiffs
which has been assigned by David W. Hammons to the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership.
Martineau implied in his Affidavit that he owned the offsets
claimed.

However, nowhere in Martineau's Affidavit or the record

did he expressly indicate that he personally owned these offsets
or that he had standing to assert them against Strand/MLK.

On the

contrary, undisputed evidence presented to the trial court
established that Martineau did not personally own any of the
asserted offsets and claims, but they were owned by Martineau and
Company and the Hammons-Martineau Partnership (R. 698, p. 19, 3435).
Martineau's Affidavit discloses that he seeks to offset onehalf of the alleged accounting

services for Magic Valley

Properties, a partnership, (R. 421, paragraphs 4 and 5) and also
offset the accounting fees incurred by Strand and Strand-related
entities (paragraph 3 ) .

Martineau failed to disclose in his

Affidavit that the services performed for Strand, the Strand
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related entities, and Magic Valley Properties were services
performed

by Martineau and Company, a partnership in which

Martineau is a partner.

Strand/MLK provided the trial court with

a list of the alleged accounting fees set forth in Martineau1 s
Affidavit complete with corresponding bills from Martineau and
Company, a partnership (R. 491-502).

To establish that Martineau

and Company was a partnership, a copy of the Application to
Transact Business Under an Assumed Name, dated August 8, 1986,
filed with the State of Utah was presented to the court (R. 503).
This document indicated that Martineau and Mark F. Jensen were the
persons who own and transact business in the name of Martineau and
Company.

Martineau admits that he assigned all of these offsets

to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership (Appellant's Brief, p. 32).
Martineau claims in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit (R. 420)
that he rendered services to Strand-related entities in the amount
of $163,471.00 plus interest (paragraph 3).

He also claims in

paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Affidavit, that he rendered $399,322.24
of services for and in behalf of Magic Valley Properties and that
Mike Strand is a one-half owner of Magic Valley Properties, and
therefore, Strand is liable for one-half of the total value of the
services rendered or $199,661.12, plus interest for a total of
$303,473.55.
claims.

But Martineau has no standing to assert those

All the accounting services for both Magic Valley

Properties and the alleged Strand-related entities were performed
by Martineau and Company.

Both Martineau and Company and Magic

Valley Properties are partnerships in which Martineau is a
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partner, but these entities are not parties to this action.
Individual partners are not entitled to utilize partnership assets
for their own individual use.
The corpus of the assets is partnership property, and
neither partner separately has anything in that corpus;
the interest of each is only his share of what remains
after debts are paid and all accounts are settled. The
rule rests upon the equities of the partners as between
each other, since each partner is entitled to regard
partnership property as held for his indemnity as
against partnership debts, and as security for the
ultimate balance which may be due him for his own share
of the partnership assets. [Emphasis added].
Gaynes v. Conn, 185 Kan. 655, 347 P.2d 458, 464 (1959).

No

partner is entitled to utilize partnership property individually
until the debts of the partnership are settled.
Annotated § 48-1-37 (1953).

Utah Code

The partnership assets are separate

and distinct from the estate of the individual partners.
. . . While a partnership has no existence separate and
apart from the members which compose it, it is
nevertheless an entity as to all matters germane to its
interest or affairs. It has its own capital, its own
assets and liabilities. In other words, the partnership
estate is separate and distinct from the individual
estates of its members. [Emphasis added].
Id. at 465.

Holding property as a tenant in partnership is quite

different from personal ownership.

Matter of Estate of Palmer,

708 P.2d 242, 248-49 (Mont. 1985).

An individual partner has no

specific personal ownership in partnership property.
Ann. § 48-1-21 and § 48-1-22.
(Okla. 1981).

Utah Code

Rowby v. Day, 635 P.2d 611, 614

The partners have only an equitable claim to

partnership property, but the legal title remains in the
partnership. Clark v. Fiedler, 44 Cal. App. 2d 838, 113 P.2d 275,
281 (1941).
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Magic Valley Properties and Martineau and Company are not
parties to this action and Martineau is not personally entitled to
utilize partnership assets for his own personal benefit.

Only

upon dissolution of the partnerships and after satisfaction of the
claims of creditors can partnership assets be distributed
individually to the named partners.

Therefore/ Martineau has no

valid offset against the judgment of Nupetco in this matter.
Martineau alleges that he had consent from the HammonsMartineau partnership to assert the claims. Martineau argues that
the terms of the partnership agreement are sufficient to establish
that there was an agreement between the partners pursuant to Utah
Code Ann § 48-1-22.

The record does not contain any evidence that

such an agreement exists.

The record does not contain any

statement from the partners of the Hammons-Martineau Partnership
indicating that there was an agreement for the use of the assets
of the partnership by Martineau, and no such agreement may be
assumed.

The partnership agreement states that the partnership

business is to ". . . collect!] any assets of Michael W. Strand or
related entities." (R. 481). This statement makes no reference to
allowing Martineau to personally claim the offset belonging to the
partnership in this action.

Even if the partnership agreement did

authorize Martineau to personally assert the assets of the
partnership for his personal gainf the utilization of these
offsets does not further the partnership purpose, which is to
operate "Magic Valley Properties and collect any assets of Michael
W. Strand or related entities."

The use of these offsets will in
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no way foster the purpose of the partnership nor will the
successful use of the offsets constitute a collection of any asset
of Michael W. Strand.

In fact, the use of these offsets will

reduce the value of the partnership by depleting its assets with
no gain.

Therefore, the Summary Judgment must be upheld because

only the Hammons-Martineau Partnership may assert such ownership
control over partnership asset and the use of these assets does
not further the purposes of the partnership.

The Hammons-

Martineau Partnership cannot assert these offsets because it is
not a party.
As a matter of law, Strand/MLK1s obligation to a partnership
of which Martineau is a member may not offset the individual
obligation of Martineau.
"A defendant in an action brought against him
individually upon a demand for the payment of which he
is individually liable can not, without showing some
equitable reason for being allowed so to do, set off
against the plaintiff's claim a debt due by the latter
to a partnership of which defendant is or has been a
member." Bishop v. Mathews & Co., 109 Ga. 790, 35 S.E.
161.
Security Management Company, Inc. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208
S.E.2d 576, 578 (1974).

See also, White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274,

166 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1969)("In an action against one partner for a
debt by him, a debt due to his firm cannot be the basis of a
setoff or counterclaim."); Powell v. Downing, 225 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.
App. 1950) ("A

partner cannot offset an indebtedness to the

partnership against an indebtedness of the individual partner.").
Martineau argues that even if he were not the owner of the
offsets, that the Summary Judgment was wrongfully entered because
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he was not given the opportunity to join the proper p a r t i e s .
argument f a i l s for several reasons.

This

F i r s t , the p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d

not to s u b s t i t u t e p a r t i e s or t r a n s f e r i n t e r e s t s p r i o r to t r i a l and
therefore,
action

no o t h e r p a r t i e s could have been brought i n t o the

(R. 6 9 7 ) .

substitute

or

Second, no motion has been made seeking to

join a party.

r e p r e s e n t e d to t h e c o u r t

Martineau's

that the par

assertion

that

he

tnerships were willing to

become p a r t i e s to the action i s unsubstantiated in the record.
the

same

token,

documentation
partnerships'
record.

Martineau

necessary

to

asserts
ratify

that

he c o u l d

Martineau's

By

obtain

use of

the

c l a i m s , but no such documentation appears in the

Martineau s t i p u l a t e d t h a t no i n t e r e s t s of the p a r t i e s

would be a l t e r e d

d u r i n g t h e pendency of t h i s a c t i o n ,

and a

s u b s t i t u t i o n or assignment i s not a v a i l a b l e .
B.

O f f s e t s and Counterclaims may not be Asserted Unless there
Exists Mutuality of Obligation Between the P a r t i e s .
Martineau

may n o t

assert

t h e Hammons judgment

against

Strand/MLK because t h e r e i s no mutuality of obligation between
Strand/MLK and the Hammons judgment.

In order for an offset to be

v a l i d , there must be mutuality between the p a r t i e s and the offset
claim.

In 80 C . J . S . Setoff

and Counterclaim § 4 8 ( a ) ( 2 ) ,

states:
I t i s a broad g e n e r a l r u l e of p r a c t i c a l l y u n i v e r s a l
application t h a t . . .
in order to warrant a setoff,
t h e demands must be mutual and subsisting between the
same p a r t i e s and furthermore must be due in the same
capacity or r i g h t , and there must be mutuality as to the
q u a l i t y of the r i g h t . In order to be mutual, the cross
demand s e t up o r d i n a r i l y must be shown t o belong
i n d i v i d u a l l y to the d e f e n d a n t , with a corresponding
-*c;

it

right to sue for them in his individual name, and
defendant, as a general rule, cannot setoff a demand on
which he is not entitled to sue in his own name.
[Emphasis added].
The mutuality requirement has also been defined in 20 Am. Jur. 2d,
Counterclaim, Recoupment, Offset, § 74 as follows:
Generally, to warrant an offset or counterclaim in an
action, the demands must be mutual, that is, the offset
or counterclaim in the action must be between the same
parties in the same capacity or right, and there must be
mutuality as to the quality of the right. The setoff or
counterclaim must be such a demand that defendant, in
his own name, or in the names of defendant sued, without
bringing in the name of a stranger to the suit, may
maintain an action of debtor on it against the party, or
all parties suing, as the case may be. . . . Negatively
stated, debts accruing in different rights cannot be
setoff against each other.
A test is that the
indebtedness for which the action is brought must be
such that if plaintiff were sued by defendant on the
setoff claimed, he could claim his cause of action in
that suit as offset. [Emphasis added].
See also; First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers,
Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980); Cook v. Jones, 115 Utah 536, 206
P.2d 630 (1949); Wood v. Akridge, 84 Utah 468, 36 P.2d 804 (1934).
There is no mutuality of obligation between Strand/MLK and
the Hammons judgment in this action.

The Hammons-Martineau

partnership is not a party to this action and Martineau is not
personally
partnership

entitled

to assert the

judgment

owned

by the

in his own individual name against Strand/MLK.

Martineau individually would clearly not be entitled to file an
action to enforce the Hammons judgment in his own name, and
therefore, the offset fails.
C.

Defendant Martineau as Assignor may not Utilize any Claims
or Offsets which He has Assigned to Another.

The concept that the assignor may not utilize any claim that
he has assigned for his own benefit is set forth in two companion
cases of the Utah Supreme Court, Taylor v. Barker , 70 Utah 534,
262 P. 266 (1927), and Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515
(1929).

In these cases, an automobile accident occurred between

the vehicles driven by Taylor and Waddoups. Waddoups assigned his
claim against Taylor to Moss, a passenger in the Waddoups vehicle.
Moss sued Taylor for the damages to the Waddoups vehicle and
personal injuries to Moss.

Before the trial on the Moss v. Taylor

action, Taylor brought an action against Waddoups for property
damage to Taylor's vehicle.
awarded to Taylor.

This case was tried and judgment was

Waddoups appealed this judgment.

Taylor

requested that the court in Moss v. Taylor instruct the jury that
Moss could not recover any damages in light of the judgment in
Taylor v. Waddoups.

The court in Moss v. Taylor refused to do

this, and judgment was entered in favor of Moss.

Similar to the

actions of Taylor, Waddoups sought to amend his answer in the
Taylor v. Waddoups, which was on appeal for a trial de novo before
the District Court, to allege the judgment on the same facts
against Taylor in Moss v. Taylor.

Waddoups1 supplemental answer

requested judgment and that the proceedings in Taylor v. Waddoups
be stayed until the Moss v. Taylor action could be completed.

The

trial court stayed all further proceedings on Taylor v. Waddoups
during the pendency of the Moss v. Taylor action.

Taylor appealed

the order staying the proceedings in Taylor v. Waddoups, and the
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and vacated the stay.

Like Martineau in the case at bar, Waddoups sought to offset
and utilize the claims he had assigned to Moss to offset or
nullify Taylor's claim against him.

In his opinion for the

Supreme Court, Justice Hansen stated that he had:
. made a somewhat extended search to find
authority in support of the contention that Waddoups may
plead the Moss judgment against Taylor as a defense to
the action of Taylor v. Waddoups, but [had] been unable
to find any such authority, and the citations of counsel
for respondent do not support such contention.
Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 P. 266, 268 (1927).

The

Supreme Court also stated:
Clearly, after Waddoups assigned his claim to the
Plaintiff in this action, there ceased to be a claim
existing in his favor against Taylor for the injury to
the Waddoups car. After the assignment, Waddoups could
not sue or counterclaim upon the assigned claim unless
the same was reassigned to him.
Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515, 520 (1929).
The effect of Strand/MLK's assignment of the cause of action
and judgment to Nupetco and Martineau's assignment of all his
right, title, and interest in the counterclaim and offsets to the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership, have divided this case into two
separate and distinct actions.

Just as Waddoups, as a defendant,

attempted to assert the claim which he had assigned to Moss as a
defense against Taylor's claim, so Martineau attempted to assert a
claim which he assigned to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership to
offset the judgment against him held by Nupetco.

Because Waddoups

assigned his claim against Taylor to Moss, Waddoups had no
counterclaim or offset which he could assert in an action by
Taylor

for Waddoups' liability in the accident.

Likewise,

Martineau has no claim or offset which he ^ n ^ow isserNupetco

Neither Waddoups

liability,

thus

keeping
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Martineau 1 s

assignment, however, :: : no*- relieve him of his personal liability
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The Partnership now owns the claim

Strand/MLK personally
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and Martineau r e t a i n s

against
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° can assert against Strand/MLK.
T h e s e two s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s m a y be d e s c r i b e d

as the main

a c t i o n of Nupetco v. Martineau and the < ::< :)i intei:cI a i m of Hammoi 1 sMartineau v. Michael Strand and MLK Investments,
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there can be no claims asserted which have previously been
assigned by the party seeking to assert them.
D.

An Assigned Claim or Offset Must Exist and Belong to the
Defendant Martineau when the Action is Filed or the Claim or
Offset may not be Asserted.
Martineau cannot assert the Hammons

judgment against

Strand/MLK because it did not exist when this action was filed and
was not a claim belonging to Martineau when the action was filed.
In order for Martineau to utilize an offset against Strand/MLK in
this matter, the offset must have existed at the time this matter
was originally filed.
1983.

Strand/MLK filed this action on August 2,

The Hammons judgment which Martineau claims as an offset

was not entered against Strand until July 30, 1986, was then
vacated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Case No. 880250-CA (R.
689-693), and then reentered on August 18, 1989.

Martineau had no

interest in the Hammons judgment until the assignment of the
judgment to the Hammons-Martineau
September 25, 1986.

(R. 488)

Partnership occurred on

The Hammons judgment and the

assignment to the Hammons-Martineau

Partnership

occurred

subsequent to Strand/MLK filing of this action.
. . .The general rule is that a setoff or counterclaim
must not only be in existence, but be in existence in
favor of the defendant interposing it, at the time the
action against him was commenced; he cannot purchase it
afterward,and then set it up. . . .
To permit a claim
existing before but acquired after the commencement of
the action to be interposed as a counterclaim would be a
departure from the rule by which actions are to be
determined according to the rights of parties as they
exist at the time the actions are commenced. It would
also encourage barratry, a practice which receives no
favor from the courts. The law never intended to permit
a defendant, after an action had been commenced against

him, to buy up, for purposes of litigation and
doubtful or other claims against the plaintiff,
interpose them to defeat in whole or in part
against which the defendant had no defense at
the suit was brought. [Emphasis added],

defense,
and then
a demand
the time
1
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See also, Pioneer Investment Corp. v. Cassler & Company, -f)8 r. 2d
803 (Wyo. 1965) .
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E.

Defendant Martineau may not Assert a Claim or Offset which
Arose after Plaintiffs Strand/MLK's Cause of Action was
Assigned to Nupetco.
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action was assigned
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. - arose after Strand/MLK's ^ause

to Nupetco.

Martineau is not entitled to

uti1ize any offsets subsequently acquired against assignor after
Martineau had notice that Strand/MLK had assigned the cause of
f
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idgment no Nupetco.

personalis , ind his a ^ o r n e v ,
assignment
en
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Judgment
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At the very latest, Martineau

receiVed

notice of Strand/ MLK' s

about March 20, 1986, the date when

iaano court mailed ilotice ~ - \'.\

assignee, M 1 ed the October
Idno

oarties that
* >< > Or ler and

:: r docketing as a foreign judgment

the assignment prior

trn the Hammons

(R. SOB-

idgment and prior to the

assignment of the Hammons judgment to the Hammons-Martineau
Partnership (assigned September 25, 1986f R. 481-488).
Martineau is not eligible to utilize the Hammons judgment as
a setoff against Nupetco, because Martineau's interest in said
judgment was acquired after he received notice of the assignment
from Strand/MLK to Nupetco.
. . . a claim arising in favor of defendant against an
assignor subsequent to the assignment or notice thereof
cannot be setoff or counterclaimed against the claim of
the assignee, at least where defendant's claim arises
under an independent contract not connected with the
contract giving rise to the assigned cause of action.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Offset § 89 (1965).
In Ropes, Inc. v. Rubinstein, 4 Wash. 2d 380, 104 P.2d 329 (1940),
the court stated that the defendant may not:
. . . after receiving such notice [of assignment]
acquire new obligations of the assignor and offset
them to the prejudice of the assignee.
The

assignment

of

the

Hammons

judgment

to

the Hammons-

Martineau Partnership occurred after Martineau received notice of
the assignment

from Strand/MLK to Nupetco and Martineau is

therefore not entitled to utilize this claim to offset Nupetco's
judgment.
POINT IV
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN SUBSTITUTING NUPETCO AS PLAINTIFF.
It was well within the discretion of the court to substitute
Nupetco as a party, especially in light of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 17(a) which authorizes the court to substitute parties
to bring about final judgments.

Martineau does not cite any

a u t h o r I t y f o i : h i • 3 p i : o p o s 11 i o i : 11: 1 a t j o i 1 i n :j N i 1 p e t c c a s e r r o i: ,, 11
the provisions of Rules 17(a) and 25(c) substantiate the court 1 s
vast discretion in procedural matters.
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CONCLUSION
A cause of action to enforce the second mortgage was filed in
Idaho by Strand/MLK but dismissed because no promissory note had
been executed embodying the obligation of Martineau to strand/MLK.
As a result of Kh LS dismissal, ^trand/MLK -•._-•.! t-his action on the
underlyinq
before

debt

evidenced by the second mortgage.

t r i a l , S trand/M: :' iss ign* :

Nupetco,

During the course ^f ^he

-

• --

Three weeks
- "

« ; -. *a ;i'iea- stipulated

the validity of the mortgage and waived his defenses against the
mo r t g a g e ,

0 n .1 } t!: :i i: o I l g h M a r t i n e a u ' s s 11 p i

m o r t g a g e foreclosure b e c o m e an issue.

•.

11 i e s e c o n d

Martineau argues that the assignment of the mortgage
prejudiced his ability to assert offsets and defenses in this
matter.

However, Martineau does not disclose what defenses or

offsets he was precluded from asserting.
is not the real party
substituted

He claims that Nupetco

in interest, but Nupetco has been

pursuant to the rules.

When Nupetco sought to

foreclose on the Idaho mortgage, Martineau asserted defenses,
contrary

to the stipulation, to block the foreclosure.

In

frustration, Nupetco petitioned the court to amend the judgment to
eliminate the requirement of foreclosing on the Idaho property.
The court granted

the amendment, but gave Martineau

the

opportunity to assert his offsets.
Martineau, however, did not own these offsets.

Martineau's

affidavit and the documents produced by Strand/MLK at the hearing
conclusively established that all accounting services asserted by
Martineau were performed by Martineau and Company and all the
offsets were owned by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership.

The

record contains no evidence that Martineau and Company or the
Hammons-Martineau partnership authorized Martineau to assert these
claims as personal offsets against Strand/MLK1s judgment.

Without

such authorization, Martineau cannot utilize these offsets and the
offsets fail.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion and utilized the
proper law and authority in its decisions and the judgment should
be affirmed.

44

/I,

.y7/?

Respectfully submitted this

day ot-'February, 1990,

l/Z4/fo

(IpttC. Petty^
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify

;. r.v

. caused to be hand delive 1 " 0 ^

a

*-viio and

correct copy or *:he foregoing to John c. Green and Kim M
GU S TIN , G R E E N

:

Li ihnf

' r^,;t L & LIA PIS , 4 8 P c • • \ 1 : • 3 f f i c e P1 a c e # 3 0 0 (l S a 1 t

Lake City, Utah, this QJJ^

day of February, 1990.
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'.of/

John T. Caine of
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 393-5367

AUG I 4 » N i « 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and
MLK INVESTMENTS, a
Partnership,

COMPLAINT

Civil No. CS35fi80
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LELAND A. MARTINEAU,
CHARLES WATERS, MAGIC
VALLEY MOTORS, INC.,
and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a
Partnership,
Defendants.
Come now the plaintiffs above named by and through their
attorney, Johi I !

Caine, and for their cause of action against

the above named defendants, complain and allege as follows:
1.
of Utah.

rhat plaintiffs are residents of Davis County, State
That defendant, Martineau, is a resident of Salt Lake

T3

>

County, State of Utah; defendant, Waters, is a resident of the

3
c

State of Idaho; defendant, Magic Valley Properties, is a

CO

partnership consisting of Martineau and Waters; defendant, Magic

CO

ac

Valley Motors, Inc., is an Idaho corporation in the business of

C4

selling ai 11:omobi 1 es . That the agreement that serves as the
03

-5

l
FA

basis for this action was entered into in the State of Utah, and

«9

CO «

be"?

expressly confers jurisdiction on this court over this action
*«*-*>
•!•<-«

-2-

and the parties hereto, and the action exceeds $5,000 exclusive
of costs, therefore, this court is a court of competent
jurisdiction.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
2.

That on or about November 5, 1979, plaintiffs entered

into a written agreement with the defendants, Martineau and
Waters, wherein plaintiffs would loan monies to the defendants
to enable them to operate their business, Magic Valley Motors.
A copy of a written agreement is attached hereto and marked as
Exhibit

!, M

A , and by this reference, makes same a part hereof.

Plaintiff further alleges that he signed this agreement without
the deleted paragraphs, and that the original is in the possession]
of the defendant, Martineau.
3.

That in accordance with the above referenced agreement,

the plaintiffs loaned in excess of $427,989.25, with interest
thereon at 15%.
4.

That numerous demands have been made by plaintiffs for

repayment of said loan and defendants have refused to repay any
amounts.
5.

That defendants1 actions constitute a breach of

contract and plaintiffs are entitled to damages for said breach
in the total amount of the loan plus 157o interest, from November
5, 1979, to the present.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 5 above

herein, and by this reference, makes same a part hereof.
7.

That defendants1 conduct above described has unjustly

-3-

enriched them to the detriment of and at the expense of the
plaintiffs in an amount in excess of $427,989.25.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
8.

Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 7 above

herein, and by this reference, makes same a part hereof.
9.

That defendants1 actions constitute an unlawful

conversion of plaintiffs' property to their own use to the
detriment of the plaintiffs, and that said conversion is willful,
wanton and deliberate, and is in the amount of $427,989.25
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1.

For the amount of $427,989.25 and any excesses to be

proven at time of trial.
2.

For the amount of 157o interest on the amount owed from

November 5, 1979 to present.
3.

For attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.

4.

For such other and further relief as the court may

deem just and proper interne premises
DATED t h i s ^ 7 7 U 2 y of July, 1983.

MICHAEL W. STRAND, Plaintiff

MLK INVESTMENTS by Michael W. Strand
Plainti""

Plaintiffs

129331
SECOND MORTGAGE

LELAND MARTINEAU, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County
State of Utah, and CHARLES WATERS, and MAGIC VALLEY PROPERTY,
a partnership comprised of the aforementioned individuals, of
Burley, County of Caaala, State of Idaho, mortgagors, hereby
MORTGAGE to MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS STRANO, mortgagees
of Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah for the aum of
TEN ($10,00) DOLLARS the following deaerlbed tract of land in
Burley, County of Cassia, State of Idahot
Lots 18, 19, and 20 Block 3, Johnaon'e Subdivision
,to the City of Burley, County of Caaala, State of Idaho
This Second, Mortage is given to secure the indebtness
between the parties in varying amounts, but presently in excess
of >200,000.00.
The mortgagors agree to pay all taxes and asseaaments on
aaid premises and a reasonable attorney1* fee in case of foreclosure.
WITNESS the hands of said mortgagors, this

t&VJ day of

June, 1980.

CJKRfcES/ WATERS
MACIclvAUEY - I M P !
~^*r* pa retireftr»*

Matt

p*>.\y*ffX "B"

STATE OF UTAH
ss«
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On thin

LCth day of June, Ifffu*, personally appeared before

ne Loland A. Martlneeu, the signer of the within instrument, who
duly acknowledged to ne that he executed the sane.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 ^ 1 ^ .
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utsh
My Commission Expires:

STATS OF

Um&

COUNTY OF £A£S£A
0n

*««

IC&K- day of June, 1960, personally appeared before

me Charles Waters, the signer of the within instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same*

Notary Public
•I*

My Commission Expires\

Jr* *f\ >€> •• » r^i j f

£•»•

W ^ 4i. &3i
^j^f^T^ 2

STATE OP UJAH
COUHTY OF S#JT

AJdiB.

to

?>•:•

<^

^ - | ^

wS r i

c*i

5

On the /&*> day of June, I960, personroTy appeared before

m*JLBLAhl& A- /yy^rWg^i

e partner in Magic Valley

fto^xftlpr*

who duly acknowledged to mo that he exeeuted the same*

notary ruoiic *
*>
^ Residing ets ^ U < ^ ^ f c c
My Commission Expires;

•sfe% V7*/

,
£«M->

A

ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM IN LITIGATION

We, Michael
jomtly.

of Salt

dnd xaluable

Lake City,

consideration

hereby

aclnowledged,

right,

title

now m

litigation

Court

W. Strand

and interest

of Salt

State
to

hereby

and MLK Investments,
of

Utah,

to

in Case No. C83-5680

Dated

this

State

the

to Nupetco

belonging

Lake County,

in consideration

us in hand paid,

assigns

of

individually
of

receipt

and
good

whereof

Associates

all

is

the

them in and to certain

claims

of

District

the

Third

Judicial

Utah.

/<??&-' day of August,

1985.

Michael

?H^A
MLK

W.

Strand

^ ^ * >

^ ^

/T^X..

Investments

STATE OF UTAH
:SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Subscribed

My Commission

)

and sworn

Expires:

to before

me this

Afrf—day

of August,

1985.

Jfa<*>t«Jlf~Ob
Residing

EXHIBIT "C"

at

Salt

Lake

County

feMiT "C"

$7 rz $57*3CT C8U5T
"! ;..«d Jcdiciai District

John T. Caine #0536
Richards, Caine & Richards
2568 S. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Phone (801) 399-4191

APR 2 6 1989
/

SALT LAI$E COUNlV

By i ^ ^ ^ Q L i ^ — - -

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership,

::
:

AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST LELAND A. MARTINEAU

Plaintiff,
v•
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES
WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS,
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a partnership.
Defendants.

:
:
:

Civil No. C83-5680
Judge Scott Daniels

;

Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly
before the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels on April 22, 1988 at the
hour of 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff having been represented by John T.
Caine and Ralph C. Petty, Defendant Leland A. Martineau having
been represented by John C. Green, the Court having reviewed the
memoranda

and affidavits

submitted

by the parties, having

reviewed the files and records herein, having received the oral
arguments of Counsel, having found that there are no material
issues of fact, that Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his

r

KH!BIT "»""

alleged interest in the claims and offsets asserted herein to
another entity, and for good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that because
Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned
alleged

claims and offsets asserted

his interest

in the

in this action to the

Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is unable to assert said claims
and offsets against the personal judgment entered against him,
and the Court therefore grants summary
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates.

judgment in favor of

All other claims Plaintiff Nupetco

Associates may have against the Defendant Leland A. Martineau and
Defendant Leland A. Martineau may have against Plaintiff Nupetco
Associates or its assignor, Michael Strand, are dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order constitutes a final
order from which appeal may be taken.
DATED this

C2^

day of April, 1989.
By the Court:

Scott Daniels, Judge
AptJfcnted a s t o Form:
/

/

J o h n C. Green
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green,
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

/(L

day of April, 1989^

Ms//. //>

John T. Caine #0536
Richards, Caine & Richards
2568 S. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Phone (801) 399-4191

¥V Z? SSSTSICT CSUCT
Ti..;c Judicial District

APR 2 6 1989
SALTL^ECGU;

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-6686

Oepi'iy Ctertc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK
INVESTMENTS, a partnership,

j:
::

ORDER SUBSTITUTING
PARTIES

Plaintiff,
*

v•
LELAND MAGIC
A. MARTINEAU,
CHARLES
WATER,
VALLEY MOTORS,
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a partnership.
Defendants.

:
::
:

Civil No. C83-5680
Judge Scott Daniels

:

The above-entitled Court, having reviewed the files and
records herein, having reviewed the Assignment of Plaintiff's
interest in the above-entitled matter to Nupetco Associates,
having reviewed the Stipulation of the parties before Judge
Moffat at the previously scheduled trial date, having received
the oral representations of the parties at the October 21 hearing
and of its own motion, and for good cause appearing, therefore:

EXHIBIT w e

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
Michael Strand and MLK Investments be substituted by Nupetco
Associates, a Utah limited partnership, as Plaintiff.
DATED this

^C^

day of April, 1989.
By the Court:

Scott Daniels, Judge

Jphr/C. Green
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green,
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

((J

day of April, 1989.

t

u^AXi^hL^

